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Safeguarding The Handicapped Child's
Right To a Free Appropriate Public
Education in Pennsylvania
I. Introduction
In our increasingly technological society getting at least a high
school education is almost a necessity for survival. Stripping a
child of access to educational opportunity is a life sentence to
second-rate citizenship.
Congress and the courts did not significantly advance the educa-
tional rights of handicapped2 children s until the 1970s, 4 despite the
I. Lee v. Mason County Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1974).
2. A handicapped child "deviates from the average or normal child (1) in mental char-
acteristics, (2) in sensory abilities, (3) in neuromuscular or physical characteristics, (4) in
social or emotional behavior, (5) in communication abilities, or (6) in multiple handicaps to
such an extent" that his school program or special educational services must be modified for
him to maximize his potential. S.KIRK, EDUCATING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 4 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as KIRK]. See also U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1976) (definition of handicapped children);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1371(1) (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1983); 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(a)
(1982); 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 13.1 (Shepard's 1982). While the handicapped child may not
derive any benefits if kept isolated, he can learn if provided with "a structured program of
education." GILHOOL, EDUCATION, AN INALIENABLE RIGHT, 597, 603 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as GILHOOL]. (Gilhool was the attorney for the mentally retarded children in Pennsylva-
nia Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See
infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text).
For purposes of this comment, the term "handicapped children" includes the following:
(I) mentally handicapped individuals who are educable mentally retarded, trainable mentally
retarded, severely and profoundly mentally retarded, and socially and emotionally disturbed;
(2) physically handicapped individuals who are physically handicapped, brain damaged, learn-
ing disabled, speech or language impaired, visually handicapped, and hearing impaired; and
(3) multi-handicapped individuals who have two or more severe handicaps as defined in clauses
(1) and (2). 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 13.1(i) (Shepard's 1982).
An "educable mentally retarded child" is one who is "so intellectually retarded that it is
impossible for [him] to be adequately educated in the regular classroom." Johnson, The Edu-
cation of Mentally Retarded Children, in EDUCATION OF EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN AND
YOUTH 201 (W. Cruickshank & G. Johnson ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Johnson]. The
educable mentally retarded child's I.Q. varies between 55 or 60 and 80. Cruickshank, The
Development of Education for Exceptional Children, in EDUCATION OF EXCEPTIONAL CHIL-
DREN AND YOUTH 4 (W. Cruickshank & G. Johnson ed. 1975). See 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE §
341.1(v)(A) (Shepard's 1979).
A "trainable mentally retarded child" is incapable of learning academic skills and will
require continual care and supervision for his entire life. Johnson, supra at 200. Nevertheless,
a trainable mentally retarded child has the potential for learning self-help skills, adjusting
socially in the home and neighborhood, and being useful economically at home, in school, or in
a well-supervised workshop. KIRK, supra at 164. This child's I.Q. ranges from 30-35 to 50-55.
Id. See 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 341.1(v)(B) (Shepard's 1979).
A "severely and profoundly mentally retarded child" requires constant care and supervi-
federal government's financial assistance for educating handicapped
children.5 Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA)l because it found that the special
educational needs of the then more than eight million handicapped
sion for his entire life, since he is incapable of living without assistance. KIRK, supra at 166.
This child's I.Q. falls below 25-30. Id. at 164. See 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 341.1(v)(C) (Shep-
ard's 1979).
The "socially disturbed child" often is described as lacking moral development, incapable
of following accepted norms of behavior, and rejecting authority and discipline. H. LOVE, ED-
UCATING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN IN REGULAR CLASSROOMS 152-53 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as LoVE). See 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 341.1(viii) (Shepard's 1981).
An "emotionally disturbed child" may be defined as one who, because of organic and
environmental influences, habitually displays: "(a) inability to learn at a rate commensurate
with his intellectual, sensory-motor and physical development; (b) inability to establish and
maintain adequate social relationships; (c) inability to respond appropriately in day-to-day life
situations; and (d) a variety of excessive behavior ranging from hyperactive, impulsive re-
sponses to depression and withdrawal." LOVE, supra at 153, quoting Haring, The Emotionally
Disturbed, in BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH ON EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN (S. Kirk & B. Weiner ed.
1963). See 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 341.1(viii) (Shepard's 1981); 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b)(8)
(1982). For definitions of other handicapped children, see 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE 9 341.1 (Shep-
ard's 1979).
3. The EAHCA requires that states provide a free appropriate public education to all
handicapped children between the ages of five and eighteen. In addition, if states provide an
education to nonhandicapped children aged three to five and aged eighteen to twenty-one, then
states must educate handicapped individuals of the same age. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1976);
34 C.F.R. § 300.122 (1982). See also 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 13.1 (Shepard's 1983) (defini-
tion of school-aged children).
During the 1980-81 school year, 182,542 handicapped children in Pennsylvania received a
public education. Of these, 71,687 were speech impaired, 50,179 learning disabled, 42,143
mentally retarded, 10,433 emotionally disturbed, and 724 multi-handicapped. DIVISION OF
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES & SPECIAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCA-
TION, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC LAW 94-
142: THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN AcT 101 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION REPORT].
4. The rights of handicapped children were greatly expanded in Pennsylvania Associa-
tion for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.Pa. 1972), Mills
v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), and Lebanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D.
135 (E.D.La. 1973). For further discussion of PARC and Mills, see L. LIPPMAN & I.
GOLDBERG, RIGHT TO EDUCATION (1973); Alschuler, Education for the Handicapped, 7 J.L.
& EDUC. 523 (1978); Haggerty & Sacks, Education of the Handicapped: Towards a Defini-
tion of an Appropriate Education, 50 TEMP.L.Q. 961 (1977); Herr, Retarded Children and
the Law: Enforcing the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 23 SYRACUSE L.REv.
995 (1972); Schwartz, The Education of Handicapped Children: Emerging Legal Doctrines, 7
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 125 (1973); Comment, The Exceptional Child's Right to an Approved
Private School Program in Pennsylvania: Practice and Problems, 84 DICK.L.REV. 417 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as DICK.L.REV.]; Comment, The Handicapped Child Has a Right to an
Appropriate Education, 55 NEB. L. REV. 637 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NEB. L. REV.];
Comment, Toward a Legal Theory of the Right to Education of the Mentally Retarded, 34
OHIO ST.L.J. 554 (1973); Comment, Educational Equality for the Mentally Retarded, 23
SYRACUSE L.REV. 1141 (1972); Comment, The Right to Education: A Constitutional Analy-
sis, 44 U.CIN.L.REV. 796 (1975).
5. In 1966, Congress added Title VI to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.
Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204, codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1213 (1966). Title VI
established the Federal Bureau of Education for the Handicapped and granted federal funds to
states for expanding special education programs. After Congress repealed Title VI, the Educa-
tion of the Handicapped Act was enacted in 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-230, §§ 601-662, 84 Stat.
175-88 (1970). This act increased state funding to improve programs for the handicapped.
6. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1976 and Supp. V 1981). Regulations published pursuant to
the EAHCA are found in 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-300.754 (1982) (formerly found in 45 C.F.R. §§
121a.1-.754).
children were not being met.'
The intent of the EAHCA was to help states educate their handi-
capped children by providing federal funds.8 States that accept such
funding 9 must create a plan that "assures all handicapped children
the right to a free appropriate public education." 10 In addition, these
states must establish and maintain procedures that guarantee due
process safeguards1" to the handicapped child and to his parents.1'
These protections include the right to receive written notice before a
change in the child's educational placement;13 to present complaints
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(1),(2) (Supp, V 1981).
8. Id. at § 1400(c). See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 7-9, reprinted in [1971]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1431-33 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. See gener-
ally Note, The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 10 U. MICH. J. L. REF.
110, 118-28 (1976) [hereinafter cited as U. MICH. J. L. REF.].
9. The EAHCA does not compel states to accept federal funds. New Mexico Ass'n for
Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 495 F. Supp. 391, 394 (D.N.M. 1980), rev'd, 678 F.2d 847
(10th Cir. 1982).
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(l)(2) (1976). The EAHCA defines "free appropriate public edu-
cation" as "special education and related services...provided at public expense and under
public supervision and direction. ... 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.4
(1982). "Special education" under the EACHA "means specially designed instruction, at no
cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including class-
room instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospi-
tals and institutions." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1976). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.14 (1982). "Related
services" include "transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive ser-
vices. . . as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special
education, and includes the early identification and assessment of handicapping conditions in
children." 20 U.S.C. §1401(17) (1976). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1982). See also Parks v.
Pavkovic, 3 EHLR (CRR) 553:610 (N.D.Il1. 1982) (definition of "free education"); R. MAR-
TIN, EDUCATING HANDICAPPED CHILDREN 57 (1979) (interpretation of "appropriate").
In Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034
(i982), the United States Supreme Court addressed the definition of a free appropriate public
education under the EAHCA. The case dealt with a deaf girl who was furnished with a special
hearing aid for classroom use. Her parents requested that she be provided with a sign-language
interpreter in all of her classes. After the school administrators denied their request, the par-
ents brought an action against the administrators for violating the EAHCA's provisions guar-
anteeing a free appropriate public education to all handicapped children.
Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court did not find a denial of a free appropriate
public education. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated that the school had satis-
fied the EAHCA's requirements by enabling the child to derive some educational benefit from
her instruction. Rehnquist concluded that since the child performed better than the average
child in her class, she must be receiving an adequate education. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-
106(a) (Supp. 1981). ("every child [entitled to] a fair and full opportunity to reach his full
potential...").
II. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.500-.589 (1982).
12. For purposes of this comment, the word "parents" includes guardian. See 22 PA.
ADMIN. CODE § 13.1 (Shepard's 1983).
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(c) (1976). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(a) (1982); 22 PA. AD-
MIN. CODE § 13.31(d) (Shepard's 1983); Id. at § 13.62(2) (Shepard's 1981). Parents of a
handicapped child receive prior written notice whenever the school "proposes to initiate or
change, or refuses to initiate or change, the identification, evaluation, or educational placement
of the child or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the child." 20 U.S.C. §
1415(b)(l)(c) (1976).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has defined a change in edu-
cational placement as "any significant alteration in the programs, activities, or services pro-
vided by [schools] to handicapped children. . ., including changes in the degree to which
handicapped children are integrated with nonhandicapped children in these programs and ac-
regarding the appropriateness of placement;" to have an impartial
hearing'8 if the placement is in dispute;'6 to be represented by coun-
sel at the hearing;' 7 and to appeal the decision made in the hearing
and bring a civil action.' 8
This comment examines how states comply with the due process pro-
cedures prescribed by the EAHCA and applicable federal regula-
tions when school officials attempt to change the educational place-
ment of handicapped children. By comparing Pennsylvania's
tivities. . .".. Concerned Parents v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d 751, 752-53 (2d
Cir. 1980). Several courts have interpreted a change in educational placement to include ex-
pulsions from school. See Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982); S-I v. Turlington,
635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981); Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp.
225 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 497 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D.N.Y.
1979); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D.Conn. 1978); Southeast Warren Community
School Dist. v. Dep't of Public Instruction, 285 N.W.2d 173 (Iowa 1979). Bd. of Educ. of
Peoria v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., .531 F. Supp. 148 (C.D.Ill. 1982) (one week suspension
did not constitute a change in educational placement).
14. The complaint may concern any aspect of the child's identification, evaluation, or
educational placement. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(E) (1976). See infra note 66.
15. The EAHCA provides parents with the opportunity for an impartial due process
hearing. To ensure the hearing officer's impartiality, the EAHCA stipulates that hearings may
not be conducted by employees of the school involved in the child's education or care. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.507 (1982).
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1976). See 34 C.F.R. §§300.506-.510 (1982).
17. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1976). See 34 C.F.R. §300.508(a)(1) (1982).
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (1982). The EAHCA mandates
that administrative hearings be available to resolve problems involving the handicapped child's
education. Each state may adopt either a hearing procedure conducted by the local school
district with an appeal to the state's department of education or a procedure conducted en-
tirely by that department. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1976). Pennsylvania has adopted the two-
tiered administrative hearing procedure. See 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 13.32 (Shepard's 1983).
Aggrieved parties may appeal these administrative decisions by commencing a civil action
in state or federal court. Under the EAHCA, the court receives the records from the adminis-
trative proceedings, hears additional evidence if a party makes a request, and renders a deci-
sion based on the preponderance of the evidence. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976). The court is
authorized to grant "appropriate relief." Id.
The scope of this phrase, however, is unclear. Compare Quackenbush v. Johnson City
School Dist., 3 EHLR (CRR) 553: 586 [1981-1982 DEC.] (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Cluff v Johnson
City School Dist., 3 EHLR (CRR) 553: 598 [1981-82 DEC.] (N.D.N.Y. 1982), (the EAHCA
does not provide exclusive injunctive remedy, and therefore, parents of handicapped children
were able to invoke rights granted by the EAHCA to recover compensatory and punitive dam-
ages in actions brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983) with Meiner v. Mis-
souri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1982); Blomster v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 3 EHLR
(CRR) 553:627 [1981-82 DEC.] (D. Mass. 1982); Dep't of Educ. v. Dorr, 3 EHLR (CRR)
553:529 [1981-82 DEC.] (D.N.H. 1982); Gregg B. v. Bd. of Educ. of Lawrence School Dist.,
3 EHLR (CRR) 553:632 [1981-82 DEC.] (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (general damages may not be
obtained under the EAHCA, but parents may recover out-of-pocket expenses incurred because
child was denied appropriate education) and Anderson v.Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1213-14
(7th Cir. 1981); Ruth Anne W. v. Alvin Independent School dist., 3 EHLR (CRR) 553:565
[1981-82 DEC.] (S.D. Tex. 1982); Powell v. Defore, 3 EHLR (CRR) 553-293 [1981-82
DEC.] (M.D.Ca. 1982); Colin K. v Schmidt, 3 EHLR (CRR) 553:507 [1981-82 DEC.]
(D.R.I. 1981); Jaworski v. Rhode Island Bd. of Regents, 3 EHLR (CRR) 553:525 [1981-82
DEC.] (D.R.I. 1981) (by providing comprehensive remedies under the EAHCA, Congress in-
tended to preclude actions under the Civil Rights Act; however, an exception permits action
for damages when the school district endangers a child's health by failing to provide an appro-
priate program or intentionally fails to afford a handicapped child due process safeguards enu-
merated in the EAHCA).
provisions 19 with those of other states, this comment addresses areas
needing clarification, and recommends statutory and regulatory revi-
sions of Pennsylvania's scheme for complying with the EAHCA. Fi-
nally, this comment proposes that Pennsylvania adopt additional
rules and regulations to ensure that handicapped children receive a
free appropriate public education. 0
II. Background
A.The Status of Handicapped Children Before 1972
Prior to 1972, handicapped children were excluded from the educa-
tional system because states lacked the understanding that such chil-
dren could benefit from education or training.' While special educa-
tion programs began to appear in the early nineteenth century,"
early case law represents a primitive attitude toward the handi-
capped and evidences society's ignorance of the handicapped's need
for education.'3
19. See Penna. Public School Code of 1949, 24 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-1371 to
13-1382 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1982) (statutory provisions pertaining to handicapped chil-
dren); 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE Ch. 13 and 341 (special education regulations).
20. See infra notes 212-43 and accompanying text.
21. See E. LEVINE & E. WEXLER, PL 94-142 AN ACT OF CONGRESS 12-13 (1981)
(hereinafter cited as LEVINE]; LOVE, supra note 2, at 22; Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of
Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" under
the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L.REV. 855, 871-72 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Burgdorf]; NEB.L.REV., supra note 4, at 641-42. Educators in early America observed that
some handicapped children made little progress with the "three R's." Instead of analyzing the
curriculum, educators believed these children were incapable of profiting from education and
labeled them "uneducable." Hence, the children's exclusion from school. Burgdorf, supra at
871. See L. FISCHER & D. SCHIMMEL, THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS AND TEACHERS 389-90
(1982) [hereinafter cited as FISCHER]; LOVE, supra at 22; NEB.L.REV., supra at 642.
22. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children (PARC) v Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp.
279, 294 (3d Cir. 1972) (1948); LEVINE, supra note 21, at 12 (the 1820s); Burgdorf, supra
note 21 at 872-73 (the 1860s). Massachusetts was the most progressive state, opening the first
school for mentally retarded children in 1850. The first classes for the mentally retarded in
public schools were established in Providence, Rhode Island, in 1896, and in Springfield, Mas-
sachusetts, in 1897. Nevertheless, handicapped children were relegated to sitting in regular
classrooms where they received inadequate instruction and experienced much frustration.
LovE, supra note 2, at 21. Massachusetts required school districts to provide special classes for
the mentally retarded once there were ten or more children. LEVINE, supra note 21, at 13.
23. In Watson v. City of Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561, 32 N.E. 864 (1893), the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld a school committee's decision to exclude a student
from school "because he was too weak-minded to derive profit from instruction." Id. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court in Beattie v. Bd. of Educ. of Antigo, 169 Wis. 231, 172 N.W. 153
(1919), was faced with the exclusion of a student who had a form of paralysis resulting in a
"peculiarly high, rasping, and disturbing tone of voice, uncontrollable facial contortions, and
uncontrollable flow of saliva." The school excluded the child because his physical appearance
depressed and nauseated his peers and teachers.
In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,207 (1926), upholding Virginia's compulsory sterilization
law, Justice Holmes wrote:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to
be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with imcom-
petence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
Concurrently, the federal government provided little financial assis-
tance for programs to educate handicapped children.2' In 1966, how-
ever, Congress added Title VI to the Elementary and Secondary Ed-
ucation Act.26 Title VI authorized funding to the states for the
overall improvement of the education of handicapped students. Con-
gress replaced Title VI in 1970 with the Education of the Handi-
capped Act, 6 which increased such funding.
B. The Expansion of the Educational Rights of Handicapped
Children in Pennsylvania Association for Retarded (PARC) Chil-
dren v. Pennsylvania and Mills v. Board of Education in 1972
Title VI of Elementary and Secondary Education Act27 and the Edu-
cation of the Handicapped Act" provided federal funding to the the
states for developing better educational programs for handicapped
children. 29 Congress' failure to specify how these funds were to be
used, however, had undesirable In addition to pointing out these in-
adequacies in the law, the PARC a and Mills1 cases expanded the
educational rights of handicapped children.
1. Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Penn-
sylvania -PARC was a class action suit brought on behalf of men-
tally retarded persons being deprived of a public education because
they had been classified as "uneducable" or "untrainable. '" Follow-
ing the testimony of numerous experts, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that every men-
tally retarded person had the potential to benefit from a program of
education and training."3 The court held for the plaintiffs and ap-
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. . . .Three genera-
tions of imbeciles are enough.
24. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1429; LEVINE, supra note 21, at 13; LOVE, supra
note 2, at 25-26. Education was, and still is, essentially a state function. See Note, Enforcing
the Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975, 92 HARv.L.REv. 1103, 1109 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HARv.L.REv.].
25. Act of Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204, codified at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1213 (1966).
26. Act of Apr. 13, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-230, §§ 601-662, 84 Stat. 175-88 (1970). •
27. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g.,'McMillan v. Bd. of Educ., 430 F.2d 1145, 1149 (2d Cir. 1970), (declaring
that if a state decided to limit funding of public education for the handicapped at the elemen-
tary school level, there was no denial of equal protection to some handicapped children since
all students were prevented from attending classes).
30. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.Pa. 1972).
31. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
32. Representing the class as plaintiffs were the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Children and the parents of thirteen mentally retarded children. 343 F. Supp. at 281.
33. Id. at 307. A codification of the statement in PARC regarding a mentally retarded
child's potential appears in a North Carolina statute that expands the statement to include all
handicapped children. The statute provides that: "[the General Assembly finds that all chil-
proved a consent decree guaranteeing mentally retarded children ac-
cess to a free public education."s Of greater significance than the
holding itself is the decree's provision entitling mentally retarded
children to due process safeguards.35
2. Mills v. Board of Education-Mills v. Board of Educa-
tion86 expanded the PARC holding by extending the right of a free
public education to all handicapped children, including mentally re-
tarded, emotionally disturbed, physically handicapped, hyperactive,
and other children with behavioral problems.37 Additionally, the
Mills court found that the District of Columbia Board of Education
had violated the due process rights of handicapped children by deny-
ing them a publicly supported education.38
In defense, the school officials argue that they lacked sufficient funds
to educate handicapped children at a level commensurate with their
need. Moreover, the officials contended that diverting additional
funds to special education would be inequitable to nonhandicapped
students.30 Nonetheless, the court ordered that if available funds
dren with special needs are capable of benefitting from appropriate programs of special educa-
tion and training and that they have the ability to be educated and trained and to learn and
develop. Accordingly, the State has a duty to provide them with a free appropriate public
education." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115c-107 (Supp. 1981).
34. 343 F. Supp. at 307.
35. Id. at 303-6. The due process protections include: (1) notice to parents describing
the proposed change in the child's educational placement and the reasons for the change; (2)
the child's right to an independent medical, psychological, and educational evaluation; (3) the
parents' right to be represented by counsel at a hearing; and (4) the parents' right to compel
witnesses to attend the hearing to question them.
PARCs consent agreement also stated that mentally retarded children must be placed in
a regular public school class before being relegated to a special public school class or any other
type of education and training program. Id. at 307. This procedure is known as mainstream-
ing, a practice used to maximize contact between handicapped and nonhandicapped children.
S. HASAZI, P. RicE & R. YORK, MAINSTREAMING: MERGING REGULAR AND SPECIAL EDUCA-
TION 6 (1979). For a discussion of the merits of mainstreaming, see NEB.L.REv., supra note 4,
at 672-77 (student commentator concludes that handicapped children learn best when placed
in regular classrooms with special education teachers who are available when necessary).
The EAHCA's mainstreaming provision is found in 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1976). To
comply, states must establish procedures that enable handicapped children to be educated with
nonhandicapped children in the least restrictive environment. Handicapped children should be
placed in special classes or separate schools only when education in regular classes with the use
of supplementary aids cannot be achieved satisfactorily. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.132 (1982).
During the 1979-1980 school year, 2,799,012 handicapped children in the United States
attended regular classes, 1,052,322 students were in separate classes, 212,021 attended sepa-
rate schools, and 70,893 were placed in other environments. In Pennsylvania, 63,269 students
received their instruction in regular classes, 64,524 children were placed in separate classes,
18,964 children were educated in separate schools, and 2836 children were placed in other
environments. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 124.
36. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
37. Id. at 868.
38. Id. at 875. In contrast, PARC never reached the plaintiffs' due process claim, since
the court disposed of the case with the consent decree. The PARC court, however, did express
satisfaction with the plaintiffs' evidence that raised "serious doubts (and hence a colorable
claim) as to the existence of a rational basis" for the state's exclusion of mentally retarded
children from school. 343 F. Supp. at 297.
39. 348 F. Supp. at 875.
were insufficient to finance all the educational programs, then the
"funds must be expended equitably in such a manner that no child is
entirely excluded from a publicly supported education consistent
with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom."4
III. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
A. Legislative Purpose
In response to the landmark decisions in PARC1 and Mills,2
Congress enacted the EAHCA.'3 The primary purpose was to grant
financial aid to the states to enable them to provide handicapped
children with a free appropriate public education." Also of impor-
tance was Congress' desire that parents need not resort to litigation
to remedy their child's educational deprivation.4
B. Provisions of the EAHCA
1. Overview.-While the EAHCA does not require the states to
accept federal funding,"" it does demand compliance with certain
specific requirements.' 7 Among the provisions the state must effectu-
ate are: (1) a policy guaranteeing all handicapped children the right
to a free appropriate public education;4" (2) a plan detailing how the
state will accomplish this goal and how the state will identify, locate,
and evaluate 49 handicapped children to determine their needs; 0 and
(3) the delegation of responsibility to the state educational agency"'
to supervise the special education programs. 52  Furthermore, the
40. Id. at 896.
41. 343 F. Supp. at 279.
42. 348 F. Supp. at 866.
43. See supra note 6. See Fanning & Schrant, The Education of Handicapped Chil-
dren: Administrative Remedies, 10 COLO. LAW. 1878, 1885 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
COLO. LAW.]. See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 8; Stafford, Education for the
Handicapped: A Senator's Perspective, 3 VT.L.REV. 71 (1978); HARV.L.RE v., supra note 24;
U.MICH.J.L.REF., supra note 8.
44. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. For a discussion of free appropriate
public education, see supra note 10.
45. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1433.
46. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
47. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412, 1413 (1976).
48. Id. at § 1412(1). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1440.
49. The tests, evaluation materials, and procedures used to evaluate the child and deter-
mine his placement may not be racially or culturally discriminatory. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(C)
(1976); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.133, .530-.532 (1982). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1453;
HARV.L.REv., supra note 24, at 1114-18 (analysis of past evaluation controversies that
stemmed from biased testing procedures and disturbing prediction that discriminatory tests
will still be used).
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(A) (1976); 34 C.R.F.
§§ 300.123-.126 (1982).
5i. Under the EAHCA, "state educational agency" means either the state board of edu-
cation or an officer who is primarily responsible for supervising the state's public elementary
and secondary schools. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(7) (1976).
52. Id. at § 1413(a)(12). Each state must establish an advisory panel on the education
EAHCA obligates each local education agency"3 or intermediate
educational unit5 4 to develop an individualized education plan (IEP)
for every handicapped child. 5 The IEP is a written statement re-
garding the child's present educational level and annual goals and
the teacher's short and long-term objectives.56 To ensure the accu-
racy of the handicapped child's educational placement, the IEP is
prepared and reviewed annually, 57 following a multidisciplinary
team's58 analysis of the child's needs.
2. State and Local Compliance with Procedural Safeguards
Enumerated in the EAHCA and Federal Regulations.-As dis-
cussed above, each state seeking federal funds under the EAHCA
must develop a detailed plan to indicate how the state will guarantee
every handicapped child an appropriate education. 59 The plan must
confirm the state's adoption of procedural safeguards enumerated in
the EAHCA and in the federal regulations. 60 These safeguards
serve to check potential arbitrary and capricious behavior by school
officials and to minimize the risk of misdiagnosis and educational
misplacement."1 The EAHCA and regulations, therefore, give par-
ents the following rights: (1) To examine all records pertaining to
the evaluation and placement of the child;62 (2)to obtain an indepen-
dent educational evaluation of their child at public expense;6 (3) to
of handicapped children. The panel must be composed of individuals concerned with the edu-
cation of these children. Most desirable would be a panel that strikes a balance between pro-
fessionals and parents, advocates, or handicapped individuals. 34 C.F.R. § 300.651 comment
(1982). The panel advises the state educational agency about unmet educational needs of the
state's handicapped children and comments publicly on the state's annual program plan and
proposed rules and regulations concerning the education of handicapped children. Id. at §
300.652.
53. "Local educational agency" refers to a "public board of education or other public
authority legally constituted within a state for either administrative control or direction
of. . .public elementary or secondary schools .. " 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (1976).
54. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.235 (1982). "Intermediate educa-
tional unit" refers to a public authority, other than a local educational agency, which is under
the general supervision of a state educational agency, which is established by state law for the
purpose of providing free public education on a regional basis, and which provides special
education and related services for handicapped children within that state.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1976).
55. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.235 (1982).
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.340, 300.346 (1982).
57. 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(d) (1982).
58. The multidisciplinary team includes a qualified employee of the board of education,
the child's teacher and parents, and, whenever appropriate, the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)
(1976). See 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 341.16(a) (Shepard's 1979).
59. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(2), 1413 (1976); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.110, .111, .121-.151 (1982).
60. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(5), 1415 (1976) (section 1415 details the safeguards); 34 C.F.R.
§§ 300.500-.589 (1982).
61. As a result of misdiagnosis, nonhandicapped children erroneously have been placed
in special education classes. FISCHER, supra note 21, at 390. For a general discussion of the
dangers of misclassification and incorrect labeling of handicapped children, see DIcK.L.REv.,
supra note 4, at 435-37.
62. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.502 (1982).
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(A) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(a)(1) (1982). For a discus-
receive written notice 6, before a change in the child's educational
placement;" (4) to present complaints about the appropriateness of
the child's educational placement;" (5) to have an impartial 7 due
process hearing when the child's educational placement is in dis-
pute;68 (6) to be represented by counsel at the hearing;61 and (7) to
appeal the decision made in the hearing and bring a civil action.70
In addition, the EAHCA entitles handicapped children to due
process protections in cases of exclusion from school.7 Moreover, the
contours of due process "var[y] according to specific factual con-
texts. .. ,[t]he nature of the alleged rights involved, the nature of
the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding.17  Con-
sequently, the longer the anticipated exclusion, the more rigorous are
sion of the confusion surrounding the "free" evaluation, see infra notes 138-48 and accompa-
nying text.
64. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
65. Id.
66. The EAHCA provides that parents have the right to present complaints concerning
any matter related to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of their child or
to the provision of a free appropriate public education. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E) (1976).
One writer suggests that the EAHCA's failure to limit the persons who may complain to the
Commissioner or state agency presumably permits anyone to make a report. Krass, The Right
to Public Education for Handicapped Children: A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL.
L.F. 1016, 1072. Krass' interpretation furthers the EAHCA's purpose of providing handi-
capped children with an appropriate education. To read into the omission that only parents can
present complaints would hinder the EAHCA's aim.
Knowing that interested parties have the right to present complaints might cause a school
to comply with the law. A "watchdog" provision could provide a similar scare tactic. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-76b(d) (West Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1944(B)(8)
(West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20A, § 7205 (1982); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4403(4)
(McKinney 1981) (state education department has the power and the duty to make periodic
inspections of special education programs and facilities and to report on whether the services
are adequate).
67. See supra note 15.
68. See supra note 16.
69. See supra note 17.
70. See supra note 18.
71. Exclusion might constitute a change in placement entitling the student to the proce-
dural safeguards guaranteed him under the EAHCA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C)(1976);
34 C.F.R. § 300.504(a) (1982); 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 13.31(d) (Shepard's 1983). The term
"exclusion" encompasses both expulsion and suspension. Generally, expulsion means a long-
term removal of a student from school. SPECIAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, DIVISION OF EDUCA-
TIONAL SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION IN SPECIAL
EDUCATION: A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GUIDE 1 (1982) (prepared by John D. Cressey) [here-
inafter cited as TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GUIDE]. Throughout most of Pennsylvania, expulsion
is an exclusion from school in excess of ten days. 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 12.6(b)(3) (Shepard's
1983). A "temporary dismissal" from school constitutes suspension. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
GUIDE, supra, at I. A "temporary suspension" is a removal from school for up to three school
days and a full suspension is an exclusion for up to ten school days. 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§
12.6(b)(1),(2) (Shepard's 1983). The Philadelphia school district differs from Pennsylvania's
other 500 school districts because a dismissal from school for more than five days is considered
an expulsion. This difference resulted from the decision in Jones v. Gillespie, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d
576 (1973).
72. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). See Pervis v. LaMarque Independent
School Dist., 466 F.2d 1054, 1057 (5th Cir. 1972); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294
F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Baker v. Hardway, 283 F.
Supp. 228, 237 (S.D.W.Va. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969).
the requirements of due process.7"
When a handicapped student is disciplined, the outlines of due
process becomes elusive.75 The nature of handicapping conditions
presents difficulties for school officials. Before a handicapped student
may be excluded from school, the school disciplinarian must assure
himself that the misconduct is unrelated to the handicap.76 Other-
wise, discipline might result in punishing a handicapped child for his
disability.7 7 Wrongful discipline defeats the purpose of an educa-
tional program designed to remedy the child's disability.
To minimize this possibility and to guarantee due process, the
EAHCA and the federal regulations afford procedural safeguards to
handicapped children and concomitant rights to their parents. If par-
ents are ignorant of these protections, then the rights guaranteed by
the EAHCA are of dubious utility.
73. See FISCHER, supra note 21, at 326.
74. The disciplinary authority of school officials is well established. See I W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 452-53 (G. Sharswood ed. 1959) for the
common law position on in loco parentis, a doctrine that enables a parent to "delegate part of
his parental authority. . .to the tutor or school master of his child." Accord, Guerrieri v. Ty-
son, 147 Pa. 239, 24 A.2d 468 (1942). The United States Supreme Court frequently has
stressed the importance of "affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school
officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control con-
duct in the schools." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 507 (1969). In Pennsylvania, the legislature has expressly granted parental authority to
school officials in the conduct of their duties. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1317 (Purdon 1962
& Supp. 1982)
75. When a nonhandicapped student is suspended from school, he is awarded the mini-
mum due process safeguards set forth by the Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975). In Goss, nine high school students were suspended for ten days because of their disrup-
tive and disobedient conduct. The students were not given a hearing prior to their exclusion
from school. In addition to holding unconstitutional the Ohio statute allowing this absence of
due process, the Court detailed the minimum constitutional requirements of due process for a
student with respect to a suspension from one to ten days.
Before a student may be suspended, a school official must notify him of the charges
against him. If the student denies the charges, the official must inform him of evidence that
implicates him. Finally, the student must be permitted to explain his actions.
76. In Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982), a handicapped child was sus-
pended from school for his misbehavior, without a school official questioning the relationship
between the child's misconduct and handicap. The school later expelled the child and denied
his request for a due process hearing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's holding that the child's expulsion constituted a change in
placement and that the school's failure to provide the child with a hearing violated the
EAHCA. The question whether there was a relationship between the child's handicap and
behavior was never answered by the Kaelin court. Nevertheless, the case illustrates how a rash
disciplinarian could harm a handicapped child. See also S-I v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981) (nine mentally retarded high school students
expelled for masturbation, use of obscenity, willful defiance of authority, and destruction of
property without a school official first determining that there was no relationship between their
handicap and their behavior). See also Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 228 (N.D.lnd. 1979);
Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (D.Conn. 1978). For a discussion of school officials'
difficulties with determining whether there is a cause and effect relationship between the stu-
dent's handicap and behavior, see TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GUIDE, supra note 80, at II.
77. 35 Op. Pa. Att'y Gen. 83, 92 (1973). See Comment, The Rights of Handicapped
Students in Disciplinary Proceedings By Public School Authorities, 53 U.CoLo.L.REv. 367,
392 (1982) [hereinafter cited as U.COLo.L.REv.].
IV.Guarantees to Ensure a Handicapped Child's Right to a Free
Appropriate Public Education
A. Parental Notice of the Provisions of the EAHCA and the Fed-
eral Regulations
As a result of PARC8 and the enactment of the EAHCA in
1975, the educational rights of handicapped children in Pennsylvania
have greatly expanded. These advancements, however, did not create
an awareness and comprehension of such rights on the part of those
whom PARC and the EAHCA were intended to protect.7 9 Thus,
states must actively seek to inform and educate parents of handi-
capped children about their child's rights and about due process pro-
cedures available to safeguard those rights.8 0
The EAHCA mandates that a school district notify parents af-
ter an initial determination that their child needs special education
and related services. 8' Additionally, the federal regulation recom-
mends that parents be present at a school meeting to plan their
child's IEP.82 If parents fail to participate, the school should ascer-
tain that they understand the proceedings at the meeting." The
scope of the school's responsibility is uncertain, however, because
neither the EAHCA nor the federal regulation dictates what kind of
information a school should convey to parents about the meeting's
procedures.84 At a minimum, a school should inform parents in writ-
78. Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279
(3d Cir. 1972). See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
79. Before the EAICA was in effect, parents of handicapped children often were led to
believe that their children were incapable of leading meaningful lives. As a result, parents
refrained from advocating their children's rights. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1433. In
Savka v. Pennsylvania, 44 Pa. Commw. 62, 403 A.2d 142 (1979), parents of a handicapped
child argued that they were denied an impartial hearing because the hearing officer was an
employee of another school district and, therefore, partial. The Savka court rejected the par-
ents' allegation that they were denied an impartial hearing because they failed to raise the
argument during the hearing. Savka illustrates how a school district might violate a provision
of the EAHCA with impunity when parents are uninformed of their rights.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in S-I v. Turlington, 635 F.2d
342 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030, recognized that most parents of handicapped
children were without the opportunity to know or to assert rights granted by the EAHCA.
Consequently, the court required that school officials, not parents, must determine whether the
child's misconduct was related to his handicap. Id. at 349. For a discussion of how schools
have taken unfair advantage of uninformed parents, see HARv.L.REv., supra note 24, at Il 11.
80. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56300 (West Supp. 1983) (school districts must seek out
individuals needing special education).
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(C) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.343 (1982).
82. 34 C.F.R. § 300.345 (1982). For a discussion of the handicapped child's individual-
ized education program (IEP), see supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
83. 34 C.F.R. § 300-345(c),(d),(e) (1982).
84. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(iii) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.345 (1982). The federal
regulation states that if parents are unable to attend the meeting, then the school must keep
records of its attempts to encourage parents to participate in the meeting. These records would
contain a list of telephone calls made, copies of letters sent to parents, and records of visits
made to the home or to the parents' place of work. The regulation also requires that a school
"take whatever action is necessary" to ensure that a parent understands the meeting's proceed-
ing about the nature of their child's problem, their right to have an
independent evaluation at public expense, and other available proce-
dural safeguards."
If the school's notification procedure is inadequate, parents may
not learn about their rights until the school notifies them in writing
about a recommended change in their child's special education
placement.86 Moreover, the school's reliance on a potentially errone-
ous presumption that parents are aware of their rights thwarts the
EAHCA's and the regulations' aim to have parents understand the
evaluation process and the statutory and regulatory provisions con-
cerning an appropriate education. 87 Thus, notice to parents regard-
ing the EAHCA's provisions is an indispensible first step toward pro-
viding each handicapped child with a free appropriate public
education.
States have implemented various methods of educating parents.
In Pennsylvania, when a handicapped child has been referred for
evaluation"8 and before such a child's educational placement is
changed,89 school officials must notify parents in writing of the refer-
ral or recommended placement change. This notice also includes in-
formation regarding the parents' right to object to the evaluation's
results and to the recommended placement change, their right to a
due process hearing,90 and their right to be represented by counsel at
the hearing. 1
Furthermore, the written notice gives parents the telephone
number and location of the local Pennsylvania Association for Re-
tarded Citizens (PARC), an organization whose employees are avail-
able to assist parents with the hearing. For parents who have only a
minimal understanding of their child's problems and rights, the
group's assistance is essential. Unfortunately, however, although the
notice alerts parents to PARC's existence, it fails to indicate how the
organization may help parents or whether there is a fee for its
services.92
Consequently, many parents may not seek PARC's help.
Furthermore, Pennsylvania's written notice should explain how
parents may obtain free or low-cost legal services, since federal regu-
ings. Id. Unfortunately, by failing to specify what a school should relate to parents, the regula-
tion leaves schools without a standard to follow.
85. A school should inform parents in writing regarding the procedural safeguards af-
forded by the EAHCA and stated in the Code of Federal Regulations.
86. This notification is required by 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(C) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 504
(1982).
87. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(l)(C)(iii) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.345 (1982).
88. 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 341.12(e) (Shepard's 1981).
89. Id. at § 13.32(1).
90. Id. at § 13.32(9).
91. Id. at § 13.32(17).
92. See Id. at § 13.32 (1)(i).
lations require that parents eventually receive this additional infor-
mation if they initiate a due process hearing.93 Otherwise, parents
might be unaware that they can obtain legal assistance without in-
curring prohibitive costs."" By emphasizing the availability of free or
low-cost legal services, the notice would encourage parents to con-
sider actions challenging intended placement changes.
A school district can utilize other methods to disseminate infor-
mation about the scope of parental rights and the availability of le-
gal aid. In New York, the state education department prepares and
distributes a handbook to parents of handicapped children. Written
for lay persons, the handbook explains the financial and educational
obligation of the state, county, city, and local school districts, and
the special education programs and legal procedures available to
parents of handicapped children. . Similarly, in New Jersey each
school district's board of education must prepare copies of the spe-
cial education chapter of the state code and all current pertinent
laws and regulations for parents who request them.
7
Likewise, in Texas, every school district must provide a docu-
ment to parents of handicapped children that details the special edu-
cation rights of handicapped children.98 These rights include the
right to contest the contents of educational records,the right to re-
quest a due process hearing and an explanation of the procedural
protections contained in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Of even greater benefit is the scheme in effect in Louisana.
There, the school board first must organize a public awareness pro-
gram detailing available special education programs and related ser-
vices.99 Second, the board must provide parents of handicapped chil-
93. 34 C.F.R. § 300.506(c) (1982).
94. The Association's employees do not charge a fee for advising or training parents or
for accompanying parents to a due process hearing. For the view that high transaction costs
deter parents from challenging a school's action, see Timar, The Aftermath of Goss in the
Federal Courts, 9 NOLPE SCHOOL L.J. 123, 140 (1981).
95. N.Y. EDUC. LAW. § 4403(8) (McKinney 1981).
96. New York supplies parents with a plethora of information. In addition to the com-
prehensive 36 page handbook, parents may obtain a pamphlet that contains general informa-
tion about the EAHCA and New York's special education laws. Also available is a handbook
entitled "Regulations of the Commissioner of Education." These regulations are designed to
assist individuals wishing to bring appeals to the Commissioner. See also NEW YORK STATE
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, YOUR CHILD'S RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION: A GUIDE FOR PARENTS
OF CHILDREN WITH HANDICAPPING CONDITIONS IN NEW YORK STATE (1981); NEW YORK
STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, KNOWING ABOUT SPECIAL EDUCATION TO HELP YOUR
CHILD; OFFICE OF COUNCIL, THE STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, THE UNIVERSITY OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK, REGULATIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION (1980).
97. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:46-7.1 (West Supp. 1982-1983). The section neglects to
mention how parents are to learn that they can obtain copies. A fee is imposed.
98. See In re Manor Independent School Dist., 4 EHLR (CRR) 504:109 (Feb. 9, 1982)
(Case No. 027-SE-1081) (hearing officer ordered each school district to send the document to
parents whose children were evaluated and found not to need a special education, thus alerting
parents to their right to contest the evaluation conducted by the school district).
99. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1944(b)(5)(West 1982).
dren with written statement of parental rights, childrens' rights and
any procedure established to protect these rights. 100 Third, the board
must involve parents of handicapped children in the development
and evaluation of special education programs." 1 Finally, the board
has the unique duty of developing in-service education programs for
parents of handicapped children.102
By participating in the programs organized for parents in Loui-
siana, and through exposure to the information contained in materi-
als distributed in New Jersey, New York, Texas, and Louisiana, par-
ents of handicapped children can better comprehend their rights, the
school's obligations, and the operation of the system. Consequently,
parents may feel less hostile to a school district, perceiving it as more
committed to providing a free appropriate public education to their
child."0 ' A reduction in hostility could minimize the number of ad-
ministrative and judicial adversary proceedings if parents and
schools could amicably resolve their differences through informal
conferences or mediation.
B. A Handicapped Child's Right to Receive Information About
His Educational Placement
Before changing a handicapped child's educational placement,
the EAHCA requires that the school provide the child's parents with
written notice.104 In a recent Texas decision, 105 a hearing officer re-
quired every school district in Texas to supply both parents and their
eligible handicapped child with written notice prior to an initial eval-
uation, initiation of a change in educational placement, or a subse-
quent evaluation. The hearing officer also ordered school districts to
provide an eligible child and his parents with a document informing
them of the special education rights of handicapped children.106
The Texas opinion shows sensitivity to the special needs of par-
ents. Even more important, it breaks with the usual practice of with-
holding information from the handicapped child concerning his in-
tended placement and demonstrates an awareness of his right to
receive such information.107
100. Id. at § 1952(A).
101. Id. at § 1944(B)(10).
102. Id. at § 1944(B)(15).
103. Smith & Podemski, Special Education Hearings: How to Do Them Correctly, 3
THE EXECUTIVE EDUCATOR 22, 24 (1981).
104. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
105. In re Manor Independent School District, 3 EHLR (CRR) 504:109 (Feb. 9, 1982)
(Case No. 027-SE-1081).
106. Id. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 5.01.06C(4) (1982) (Maryland regulation re-
quiring school districts to provide parents and "students as appropriate" with written informa-
tion regarding their rights and the safeguards to protect these rights).
107. In California, parents and pupils may initiate the due process procedures enumer-
ated in the EAHCA and California's code. CALIF. EDUC. CODE § 56501 (West Supp. 1982).
If the child is learning disabled or socially and emotionally dis-
turbed, he is mentally capable of understanding whether his educa-
tion program is too difficult or too easy, or whether other problems
need to be addressed. 108 Moreover, if parents alone can contest their
child's placement or make suggestions regarding the program, 9 the
child suffers if his parents refuse to participate in planning an educa-
tion geared to his needs."" Therefore, unless his parents serve as his
advocate,"' the child is at the mercy of school officials desirous of
cutting corners on special education programs." 2 To avoid leaving a
child with neither an appropriate program nor an opportunity to con-
test his educational placement, schools should solicit the child's opin-
ion, permit him to make suggestions, and involve him in decisions
concerning his placement.
C. Procedures to Reduce the Frequency of Wrongful Discipline
Ensuring that a child with special needs receives a free appro-
priate public education without being wrongfully disciplined requires
more than the participation of well-informed parents in the develop-
ment of their child's program. Each state receiving federal funds
under the EAHCA must eliminate obstacles to a handicapped child's
development and adopt procedures that reduce the incidence of
wrongful discipline.
1. The Use of an Individualized Education Program to Re-
duce the Frequency of Wrongful Discipline.-The EAHCA entitles
a handicapped child to an individualized education program (IEP) to
assist him in maximizing his potential." 3 Although Pennsylvania's
Notwithstanding the child's right, California law requires that schools notify only parents of
recommended changes in the child's placement. Id. at § 56506. Accord CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 10-76h(a)(l) (West Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.122, § 14-8.02(f)(Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1982-1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1952(B)(3)(West 1982); N.Y. EDUc. LAW §
4402(3)(c)(McKinney 1981). In contrast, Pennsylvania's enigmatic regulation requires that a
school provide parents and their child with notice of the school's proposed action, but the
regulation further states that the notice need inform only parents of the various due process
safeguards. See 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 13.32 (Shepard's 1983).
108. See supra note 2.
109. Many states deny children the right to assert any of the due process safeguards
provided by the EAHCA, like requesting a due process hearing before an impartial hearing
officer, appealing the hearing's decision, and bringing a civil action after exhausting all admin-
istrative remedies. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
110. Whether due to lack of interest or time, deference to "benevolent" school officials,
or inability to take time away from work, parents may forego challenges to placement deci-
sions. See HARV.L.REv., supra note 24, at I110-11. Denied the right to protect themselves
and without parents to safeguard their rights, handicapped children are incapable of effecting
changes in their educational placement.
11l. Many states permit only parents to assert the rights of their handicapped children
and not the children themselves. See supra note 109.
II 2. Sindelar, Suspensions and Expulsion of Handicapped Students: The Evolving
Case Law, 12 SCHOOL LAW BULLETIN 1, 6 (1981).
113. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
IEP provision 11' complies with the minimum requirements enumer-
ated in the EAHCA, 1 5 it does not require, nor does the EAHCA
mandate, that the IEP include a statement of potential ways in
which the handicapped child possibly might behave. By indicating
what behavioral patterns to expect from the child and what can be
done to alleviate his problems, the IEP would further minimize the
risk of error when a school official disciplines a handicapped
student.1"6
A school official must make an informed decision whether the
child's behavior is a manifestation of his handicap. Requiring a
school official to examine the handicapped child's recurring patterns
of behavior and the connection between the child's behavior and his
handicap could reduce wrongful discipline. 17 Thus, the multidiscipli-
nary team's 18 inclusion of additional information on the handi-
capped child's IEP could further help the child maximize his poten-
tial by protecting him from wrongful discipline. 119
2. The Use of In-Service Training to Educate Instructors
About Handicapped Children.-To minimize the riskofwrongful dis-
cipline, school officials need a certain degree ofexpertise concerning
theneedsand rights of handicappedstudents.2 0 School officials may
acquire such information by attending in-service special education
training programs provided by school districts. In Pennsylvania, the
State Board of Education requires school districts to provide such
114. 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 341.15 (Shepard's 1979).
115. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.346 (1982).
116. One school district includes statements in the 1EP that describe the child's handi-
cap, his handicap-related behavior, and the child's behavior that is unrelated to his handicap.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GUIDE, supra note 71, at 11-12. See HARv.L.REv., supra note 24, at
1122-23 n.130-131, and accompanying text; U.COLO.L.REV., supra note 77, at 388. For a
discussion of the school official's difficult task of determining whether the child's behavior is
related to his handicap, see supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
117. A school official's consideration of the child's IEP that includes a brief history of
the child's conduct should not replace the official's circumspect questioning of whether there
exists a connection between the child's handicap and behavior. Predictive labeling may be
unreliable. See Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested Framework for Constitu-
tional Analysis, 51 TEX.L.REV. 1277, 1305.07 (1973). A disciplinary official should not rule
out other types of conduct that could be handicap-related merely because a child's IEP con-
tains a statement of behavioral patterns.
I IS. See supra note 58.
119. The interruption of a handicapped child's education could severely restrict the
child's attainment of self-sufficiency and independence. A list of suspensions on the child's
educational record could interfere with future opportunities for further education and employ-
ment. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575 (1975). A handicapped student's regression
caused by interruptions in his education program, together with his "limited recoupment ca-
pacity, renders it impossible or unlikely that the student will" be able to maximize his poten-
tial. Armstrong v. Kline, No. 78-172 (E.D.Pa., Sept. 5, 1979) (Remedial order No. 2).
120. See S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030
(1981) (school officials who were authorized to determine whether misconduct was related to
the handicap were incapable of making such a decision since they lacked the necessary
expertise).
training for all personnel involved in the education of handicapped
children.""' The regulation containing this order,however, neglects to
state how frequently such training should be offered."
2
Texas,on the other hand, requires the commissioner of educa-
tion to guarantee that all school districts devote one full day of their
required in-service program each school year to special education
training sessions for regular and special education teachers who in-
struct handicapped students." 3 If it adopted a rule that specifies the
frequency of special education in-service training sessions, the Penn-
sylvania State Board of Education could effect compliance by impos-
ing a penalty, like a temporary loss of funds, on school districts that
fail to comply with the Board's standard. 2
3. Elimination of Discriminatory Disciplinary Procedures in
Pennsylvania.-Exclusion of a handicapped student for more than
ten days is deemed a change in placement, entitling his parents to
written notice, an opportunity for a hearing, and the right to be rep-
resented by counsel at the hearing.' 23 Three factors minimize in-
stances of wrongful discipline. First, the child's parents must consent
to the exclusion.' 26 Second, if the child's parents refuse to consent,
the child may not be removed from his educational program pending
the hearing regarding his placement.12 7 Third, the school official
bears the burden of proving that the student's misconduct was not a
manifestation of his handicap and that the child should be
excluded.'28
121. 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 341.57(d) (Shepard's 1979).
122. Equally vague is Maine's statute that requires the commissioner of education to
"li]nform and train each school administrative unit on exceptional students' rights to due pro-
cess under state laws and rules and federal law and regulations." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
20A, § 7204(5)(B) (1982). Other states' provisions also lack guidance on how often schools
must provide in-service training programs to educate instructors of handicapped children. See
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 5.01.03F (1982); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 29-1.1(g) (1978).
123. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.104(a)(6)(Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). See also LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 1953 (West 1982). See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1457-58.
124. The EAHCA authorizes a state educational agency to terminate funding to local
educational agencies for failing to comply with any provision of the EAHCA. 20 U.S.C. §
1414(b)(2) (1976). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1944(B)(16)(West 1982)(funds may be
withheld following a due process hearing); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20A, § 7206 (1982)
(commissioner of education may order compliance, withhold financial aid, and refer the matter
to the Attorney General); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A.13.080 (1982) (superintendent of
schools may apply appropriate sanctions to any school district that fails to comply with the
special education laws); Krass, The Right to Public Education for Handicapped Children: A
Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1016, 1072-73.
125. 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 13.32 (Shepard's 1983).
126. Id. at § 13.32(1).
127. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1976); 22 PA. ADMiIN. CODE § 13.32(22) (Shepard's
1983). The practice that maintains the status quo is known as the "stay put" provision. S-I v.
Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981); Monahan
v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074, 1088-89, affd in part, vacated in part, 645 F.2d 592 (8th
Cir. 1981); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D.Conn. 1978).
128. See supra note 79.
Instances of wrongful discipline likewise may be minimized in
situations when a school official considers excluding a mentally re-
tarded12 9 child for fewer than tendays. Sincethe official initially must
consider the connection between the child's handicap and his behav-
ior,18 0 he presumably would avoid rash decisions. If, however, the
child has a learning disability or is socially and emotionally dis-
turbed (SED), s1 Pennsylvania's regulations prescribe the application
of minimal rules governing nonhandicapped students.3 2 Although
Pennsylvania school administrators are advised to consider the possi-
ble relationship between the learning disabled or SED child's handi-
cap and his problem behavior prior to suspension, 183 exercise of this
consideration is only recommended, not mandatory. Clearly, there-
fore, the risk of wrongful suspension of an SED or learning disabled
child increases if a school official fails to consider the child's handi-
cap.134 If a school official were required to consider an IEP that de-
lineated foreseeable problems related to the child's handicap, the of-
ficial could learn whether the child's present misbehavior was
handicap-related. 88
Not only should school officials consider the child's IEP, but the
Pennsylvania State Board of Education should eliminate the separate
disciplinary standards for handicapped children who are mentally re-
tarded and for handicapped children who are not. Two reasons sup-
port elimination of the separate procedure for handicapped children
other than the mentally retarded. First, the EAHCA neither requires
nor mentions states' maintenance of separate rules. Second, Pennsyl-
vania's rules are useless because the due process safeguards afforded
SED and learning disabled children fail to protect them: the miscon-
duct of such children inherently relates to their handicap,"a6 yet
129. See supra note 2.
130. 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 13.62(2) (Shepard's 1981).
131. See supra note 2.
132. 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 341.91(b)(4) (Shepard's 1982), 12.6 (Shepard's 1983).
See supra note 75. These rules do not require a school official to consider the child's handicap.
Thus an SED or learning disabled child could be suspended for at least two days without a
hearing if he is informed of the reason for suspension and given an opportunity to explain his
conduct. Memorandum from Gary J. Makuch, Director, Bureau of Special Education in Penn-
sylvania, to Directors of Special Education and Elementary Principals 2 (August 30, 1978).
133. See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GROUP FOR RIGHT TO EDUCATION, REQUIREMENTS
FOR SUSPENSION/ExCLUSION OF EXCEPTIONAL STUDENTS 3 (1982) (a document developed by
the Bureau of Special Education of the Pennsylvania Department of Education to supply
school administrators with information on requirements for the exclusion of handicapped
students).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 117.
135. See generally text accompanying notes 113-119.
136. A student who has a learning disability may reveal his learning difficulties by his
"hyperactivity, impulsivity, low frustration level and short attention span... [or] through his
fighting, loss of temper control and generally aggressive behavior." See Levinson, The Right to
a Minimally Adequate Education for Learning Disabled Children, 12 VAL. U.L. REV.
253,272 (1978).
Pennsylvania's regulations do not require that a school official con-
sider this relationship when he prepares to suspend these children. 13
D. The Handicapped Child's Right to Receive a Free Independent
Evaluation
The appropriateness of a handicalped child's free public educa-
tion depends upon the reliability of the tests performed on the
child 38 and the competence of the tests' evaluators. The EAHCA
therefore grants parents of a handicapped child the right to obtain
an independent evaluation of their child when a school recommends
a change in the child's educational placement. 139
Although a federal regulation provides for an evaluation at pub-
lic expense, 14 0 the federal regulation1 4 and some state statutes and
regulations1 42 may deter parents from taking advantage of this right
because its exercise is conditioned on whether the school requests an
impartial hearing to show that its evaluation is appropriate. If the
hearing officer finds that the school's evaluation is appropriate, then
parents still may seek an independent evaluation, but not at public
137. Consequently, a school official who suspends a learning disabled child for handicap-
related conduct effects a punishment of the child's disability. This discrimination violates Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive
Services and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (Supp. I 1979).
Section 504 of the Act prohibits discrimination of the handicapped in any federally funded
program. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 111 1979). Courts have found that Section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act provides a remedy for a violation of Section 504. Pushkin v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981); Quackenbush v. Johnson City School Dist.,
3 EHLR (CRR) 553:586 [1981-82 DEC.] (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Cluff v. Johnson City Central
School Dist., 3 EHLR (CRR) 553:598 [1981-82 DEC.] (N.D.N.Y. 1982); McGowan v.
Hahn, N. 78-C-4233 (N.D.1ll. July 27, 1981); Medley v. Ginsberg, 492 F. Supp. 1294
(S.D.W.Va. 1980).
138. See supra note 49.
139. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(A) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.503 (1982). If
parents obtain an independent evaluation of their child at private expense, the school must
consider the evaluation's results when contemplating changes in the child's program, and par-
ents may present the evaluation's results as evidence at a due process hearing. 34 C.F.R. §
300.504(c)(1),(2) (1982). Contra Bender & Lorant, Public Law 94-142: Challenging Individ-
ualized Education Programs Through Due Process Considerations, 7 W. ST. U.L. REV. 137,
152-53 (1980) (school districts frequently ignore the recommendations of the independent
evaluator).
140. 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(a)(3)(ii) (1982) ("public expense means that the public
agency either pays the full cost of the evaluation or insures that the evaluation is otherwise
provided at no cost to the parent. .. ").
141. Id. at § 300.503(b) (1982).
142. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56329(b) (West Supp. 1982) (identical to the federal regula-
tion); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.122, § 8.02(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983) (identical to the
federal regulation); MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 5.01.07A(6)(b) (1982); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch.71B, § 3 (West Supp. 1979) (handicapped child may obtain a free evaluation from
child evaluation clinics or facilities approved of by the department of education); 22 PA. AD-
MIN. CODE § 13.32(1)(iii) (Shepard's 1983).
In New York and Wisconsin, on the other hand, parents may obtain an independent eval-
uation of their child at public expense when they disagree with the school's evaluation. 8
N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.5(b)(2) (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 115.81(5) (West Supp. 1982-1983)
(school district will reimburse parents who are unable to afford an examination or evaluation).
expense. 4"
When parents in Pennsylvania contest the recommended change
of their child's placement, the school notifies the parents that their
child is "entitled" to an independent medical, psychological, and
educational evaluation. " The notification, however, does not, ex-
plain the word "entitled." Moreover, nowhere in the notice can par-
ents discern that their child has a right to an independent evaluation
at public expense. Thus, Pennsylvania's special education provisions
are not in accord with the spirit of the federal regulation that pro-
vides a handicapped child with a free evaluation'4" and obstructs
parents' right to obtain a free independent evaluation. Consequently,
the notification's ambiguity may deter parents from seeking another
evaluation of their child.
Similarly, parents of handicapped children in Maryland may be
unaware of their right to obtain an independent evaluation of their
child. A regulation promulgated by the Maryland Board of Educa-
tion obligates schools to inform parents of where their handicapped
child may obtain an independent evaluation, but only if parents re-
quest the information.'" While Maryland's regulation disadvantages
parents who are ignorant of their child's rights and therefore may
not request the information, it is in accord with the federal regula-
tion,' 7 which does not require schools to divulge information until
parents make a request.
To prevent federal and state regulations from circumventing the
EAHCA's provision that grants parents the right to obtain an inde-
pendent evaluation of their child, schools should be required to in-
form parents where their child may receive an evaluation at public
expense. Without such an evaluation, "appropriate" becomes a
meaningless word to many parents who would be unable to mount an
effective challenge to the school's recommended placement
change.'
E. The Right to a Hearing Before an Impartial Hearing Officer
In addition to granting parents the right to have their child in-
143. See In re Marin County Office of Educ., 4 EHLR (CRR) 504:166 (May 17, 1982)
(Case No. 82-1). As one commentator points out, the added hearing causes delay and serves
only to protect against evaluations that fail to conform to the EAHCA's requirements. More-
over, a hearing officer would have a difficult task to detect whether the original evaluators were
biased or in error without a second evaluation with which to compare the first. HARv.L.Rav.,
supra note 24, at 1112 n.60 and accompanying text.
144. 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 13.32(1)(iii) (Shepard's 1983).
145. 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(a)(3)(ii) (1982). See supra note 139.
146. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 5.01.07A(6)(b) (1982).
147. 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(a)(2) (1982).
148. One such change might be the relegation of a mentally retarded child from a place-
ment in school to a more restrictive "education and training" program under the auspices of
the Department of Public Welfare. 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 13.62(9) (Shepard's 1982).
dependently evaluated, the EAHCA affords parents the right to an
impartial due process hearing to resolve disagreements about their
child's educational placement. " The EAHCA's provision that
grants this right specifies that a hearing may not be conducted by an
employee of the educational unit or agency involved in the handi-
capped child's program. 50 I
States have sought to guarantee the impartiality of hearing of-
ficers by various methods of selection. In Pennsylvania, the regula-
tion pertaining to hearing officers requires that the officer not be an
agent, employee, or officer of the school district where the handi-
capped child resides.' 5' The regulation, however, does not affirma-
tively state how the hearing officer is to be chosen. The pertinent
statutory provisions in Maine"' and Wisconsin'" neither mention
how the hearing officer will be selected nor contain criteria referring
to impartiality or interests that might render an individual incapable
of being impartial.
In Robert M. v. Benton,5 4  the Eighth Circuit dealt with
whether Iowa's Superintendent of Public Instruction could serve as
an impartial hearing officer. a5 The court held that the EAHCA pre-
cluded employees of state educational agencies from serving as hear-
ing officers, even though the employees were not directly involved in
the child's education program.'" The court also found that the Su-
perintendent was a State Board of Public Instruction employee who,
therefore, was indirectly involved in the education of the handi-
capped child.15 7 Hence the Superintendent was partial. Similarly, the
Third Circuit, in Grymes v. Madden, 58 held that the EAHCA's im-
partiality requirement forbade the use of Delaware State Board of
Education employees as review officers. Thus, the EAHCA's provi-
sion preventing employees of educational agencies involved in the
149. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (1982).
150. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1976). The pertinent federal regulation adds that a hear-
ing may not be conducted by anyone with a personal or professional interest that would con-
flict with his objectivity. 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a)(2) (1982).
151. 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 13.32(12) (Shepard's 1983).
152. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20A, § 7207(3) (1982) (effective July 1, 1983).
153. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 115.81(4m) (West Supp. 1982-1983).
154. 634 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 1980).
155. The Superintendent had presided over the due process hearing of a mentally re-
tarded child who was contesting the Superintendent's recommendation that she be placed in a
more restrictive educational setting.
156. Accord Vogel v. School Bd. of Montrose R-14 School Dist., 491 F. Supp. 989
(W.D.Mo. 1980) (State Deputy Commissioner of Education was not an impartial hearing of-
ficer). Warren v. Nat'l Ass'n of Secondary School Principals, 375 F. Supp. 1043 (N.D.Tex.
1974) (teacher who accused student of drinking could not serve as a judge at the student's
dismissal hearing).
157. The court rejected the Superintendent's argument that he was not an employee of a
direct provider of educational instruction, like a local school board, but rather a supervisor of
the provider. Robert M. v. Benton, 634 F.2d 1139, 1141 (8th Cir. 1980).
158. 672 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1982)(per curiam).
child's program from serving as hearing officers has been broadly
interpreted to preclude individuals who are only indirectly involved
in the program.
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
expanded the meaning of involvement even further. In East Bruns-
wick Board of Education v. New Jersey State Board of Educa-
tion,1" the court declared that it is the "State's responsibility to go
beyond its own doors to select hearing officers" who comply with the
EAHCA's impartiality requirement. 160 Whether the court meant
that New Jersey should hire hearing officers from a neighboring
state or officers unassociated with New Jersey's educational agencies
is unclear. In Connecticut, an impartial hearing board is composed
of individuals knowledgeable in areas pertinent to the child's
handicap. 6"
While the in-state procedure mentioned above seems to be a vi-
able alternative, there nonetheless may be a problem in some states.
Two writers 162 point out that the requirements for hearing officers in
California restrict the selection to individuals who are well-informed
in the special education field and who are associated with an educa-
tional institution. Considering that most California schools are pub-
lic institutions, the impartiality of hearing officers might be suspect.
Nevertheless, a scrupulous method of selecting impartial hearing of-
ficers minimizes the chances of picking a partial individual to preside
over the hearing.
In Maryland, a statutory scheme for choosing hearing officers
better protects handicapped children from the decisions of partial
hearing officers. When parents request the county board of education
to review their child's proposed educational placement, " the board
appoints a hearing officer or a hearing board to hear the case and
render a decision. 64 Further, the statute mandates that neither the
hearing officer nor the members of the board may be employees of
the State Board or any county board of education, or have any inter-
est that would conflict with the hearing officer's objectivity at the
hearing. "
After exhausting all available administrative remedies and pro-
cedures at the local level, aggrieved parents may request a review of
159. 4 EHLR (CRR) 554:122 (D.N.J. July 7, 1982) (No. 81 Civ. 3600).
160. Id. at 554:123.
161. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-76h(c) (West Supp. 1982) (hearing officers may be
employees of state educational agencies or may be qualified individuals from outside the
agencies).
162. Bender & Lorant, Public Law 94-142: Challenging Individualized Education Pro-
grams Through Due Process Considerations, W. ST. U.L. REv. 137, 154 (1980).
163. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 8-415(a)(1) (Supp. 1982).
164. Id. at (a)(2)(i),(ii).
165. Id. at (a)(5)(i),(ii). See MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 5.01.07A(7)(d) (1982).
their child's placement from the State Board of Education. 6 At the
local level, hearing officers or panel members are selected in rotating
alphabetical order from a list of people qualified to serve.167 The des-
ignation of review panel officers at the state level differs substan-
tially. First, the State Board provides parents with four names cho-
sen in rotating alphabetical order from a list, unless the parties
stipulate otherwise. 68 Parents then have the option of picking three
of the four names and notifying the Board of their selection within
fifteen days. 69 Before making their decision, parents can examine
the hearing officers' curricula vitae, since this information is open to
public scrutiny. 10
By providing parents with an opportunity to have some choice in
selecting hearing officers whom they can scrutinize beforehand and
who are not employees of a school board, Maryland's system reduces
the risk of selecting hearing officers who serve merely to rubber-
stamp the school's decision regarding the program of "high-cost chil-
dren."'' All too often the school's placement team only recommends
programs that the school district can afford. 72 A desirable system
like Maryland's, if adopted in Pennsylvania, would help to ensure
that handicapped children receive a free appropriate public educa-
tion. 1 8 As an additional safeguard, parents should be able to ques-
tion their hearing officer about his familiarity with the facts of the
case. The officer's responses could provide valuable insight about




When a school decides to alter a handicapped child's educa-
tional placement, the EAHCA grants the child's parents the right to
166. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 8-415(b)(1) (Supp. 1982).
167. Id. at (a)(4).
168. Id. at (b)(5)(i).
169. Id. at (b)(5)(ii),(iii).
170. Id. at (b)(4).
171. Sindelar, Suspensions and Expulsion of Handicapped Students: The Evolving
Case Law, 12 SCHOOL LAW BULLETIN 1, 6 (1981).
172. Id.
173. Illinois' method of choosing hearing officers, like Maryland's scheme, reduces the
possibility of selecting partial officers. The State Board of Education provides parents and the
school board with a list of five prospective impartial hearing officers. Parents and the school
board alternately strike one name from the list until one name remains. Additionally, hearing
officers may not reside in the school district and may not be employed by the school district, by
any program in which the district participates, or by any agencies that are directly involved
with diagnosing, educating, or caring for handicapped students. Furthermore, impartial hear-
ing officers must be knowledgeable of federal and state special education statutes, rules, and
regulations. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.122, § 8.02(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
174. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). See In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
an impartial due process hearing. 75 At the hearing, parents are enti-
tled to be represented by counsel or individuals knowledgeable in the
field of special education.176 The EAHCA, however, does not provide
for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party.7  Thus, for
the "middle-class majority of this country, persons too affluent to
qualify for government funded legal services but not wealthy enough
to afford the fees of major law firms,' '178 a lawyer's services might
not be utilized at either the due process hearing or the judicial pro-
ceeding1 79 after parents exhaust their administrative remedies."
If a state does not grant attorney's fees for parents who lack the
funds to retain a lawyer, the EAHCA's procedural protections be-
come inaccessible. Admittedly, some courts, including the United
States Supreme Court, have found that due process does not require
a lawyer's presence at a noncriminal proceeding.' 8' Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged the great benefit counsel can pro-
vide: "Counsel can help delineate the issues, present the factual con-
tentions in an orderly manner, conduct cross-examination, and gen-
erally safeguard the interests of the recipient."' 82 Often parents are
unable to understand or articulate either the issues involved in a par-
ticular case or the special needs of their handicapped child. There-
175. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (1982).
176. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.508 (1982). See 22 PA. ADMIN.
CODE § 13.32(17) (Shepard's 1983). See also Madera v. Bd. of Educ. of New York City, 386
F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968); Goldwyn v. Allen, 281 N.Y.S.2d
899 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (students have a right to be represented by counsel at a disciplinary
hearing).
177. A federal regulation, however, does require that a school inform parents of any free
or low-cost legal services available in the area if parents request the information or if parents
or their child's school initiates a due process hearing. 34 C.F.R. § 300.506(c)(1),(2) (1982).
178. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 473 n.4 (1978) (Marshall, J., con-
curring). According to the Legal Services Corporation Poverty Guidelines, 45 C.F.R. § 1611,
app. A (1982), a family of four whose income exceeds $11,625, the maximum income sug-
gested by the Legal Services Corporation, is ineligible for legal aid, unless other factors indi-
cate that eligibility should be allowed. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1611.3-.6 (1982). Consequently, many
individuals effectively will be prevented from obtaining legal services. See Krass, The Right to
Public Education for Handicapped Children: A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL.
L.F. 1016, 1075.
179. See supra note 18.
180. Courts have held that plaintiffs are not required to exhaust their administrative
remedies set forth in the EAHCA if it would be futile to do so. Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School
Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 447 (3d Cir. 1981); Monahan v. Nebraska, 645 F.2d 592, 597 (8th Cir.
1981); H.R. v. Hornbeck, 524 F. Supp. 215, 219 (W.D.Md. 1981); Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp.
225, 227-28 (N.D.lnd. 1979); Sherry v. New York Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1335
(W.D.N.Y. 1979); Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 587 (E.D.Pa. 1979) remanded on
other grounds sub nom. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir.. 1980); Loughran v.
Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110, 112 (D.Conn. 1979). Strict standards for determining futility led
to dismissals in Riley v. Ambach, 668 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1981); Lombardi v. Ambach, 522 F.
Supp. 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). See U. CoLo. L. REV., supra note 77, at 397-401.
181. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Toney v. Reagan, 467 F.2d 953 (9th Cir.
1972); Camp v. United States, 413 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. Workman's Compen-
sation Appeal Bd., 14 Pa. Commw. 220, 321 A.2d 728 (1974); In re Coatesville Area School
Dist., 4 EHLR (CRR) 504:145 (Aug. 11, 1982) (Case Nos. 203A, 203B, 203C).
182. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970).
fore, pitting the school board's experienced member or attorney
against parents unaided by counsel is inconsistent with traditional
notions of fairness.
Although the EAHCA does not entitle a prevailing party to at-
torney's fees, there are two alternative statutory bases for a recovery.
Some courts 83 have found that violations of Section 504184 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973188 permit a grant of attorney's fees.1"6
This statute proscribes discrimination against the handicapped in
programs that receive federal aid. Moreover, courts 87 have also
awarded attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976,188 which allows such an award when a plaintiff
successfully proves the violation of a federal statutory right.
The award of attorney's fees under either of these statutes de-
pends upon whether parents prevail in the underlying action.'89 Con-
sequently, parents may hesitate to challenge a school's recommended
placement change. Moreover, parents frequently will be unaware of
the possibility of recouping attorney's fees.'90 Even if parents reside
in a state complying with the federal regulation"' that requires a
school to inform parents of available free or low-cost legal ser-
vices,192 parents nevertheless may be ineligible for such services. 98
California law provides parents with the opportunity to recover
attorney's fees regardless of the case's outcome.'" The law also re-
quires a school to notify parents, at least ten days before a state
hearing, that it intends to use an attorney.' 5 Upon receiving the no-
tice, parents may hire an attorney and have the state pay his fees'"
183. Patsel v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 530 F. Supp. 660 (D.D.C. 1982); Camp-
bell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.Ala. 1981); Tatro v. Texas, 516
F. Supp. 968 (N.D.Tex. 1981); Pratt v. Bd. of Educ. of Frederick County, 501 F. Supp. 232
(D.Md. 1980).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 111 1979).
185. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as amended by Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services
and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (Supp. 111 1979).
186. The Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Act of
1978 grants the court authority to award attorney's fees to prevailing parties in a Section 504
claim. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (Supp. 111 1979).
187. Dep't of Educ. v. Valenzuela, 524 F. Supp. 261 (D. Hawaii 1981); Mattie T. v.
Holladay, 522 F. Supp. 72 (N.D.Miss. 1981).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
189. See, e.g., Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981); Hines v. Pitt
County Bd. of Educ., 497 F. Supp. 403 (E.D.N.C. 1980) (fees denied).
190. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 177.
192. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56502(a) (West Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.122, §
8.02(0 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983); MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 5.01.07A(6)(d) (1982).
See NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, YOUR CHILD'S RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION,
A GUIDE FOR PARENTS OF CHILDREN WITH HANDICAPPING CONDITIONS IN NEW YORK
STATE 18 (1981) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. GUIDE).
193. See supra note 177.
194. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56507(a) (West Supp. 1982).
195. Id. at (b)(1).
196. Id. at (b)(3).
If, however, parents have retained an attorney prior to receiving the
school's notice, the state has no duty to pay for the representation.19
To allow such an important matter to rest on who has sought
legal representation first is inequitable and illogical. The California
law's positive aspect of providing some parents with free legal repre-
sentation is outweighed by the discouraging effect of this procedural
scheme on parents who wish to engage counsel. When a child's lib-
erty and property interests""9 hinge upon a hearing or trial to deter-
mine his educational placement, a school should not only permit par-
ents to be represented by counsel, but should incur attorney's fees on
behalf of needy parents. Without this safeguard, the EAHCA's pro-
cedural protections become illusory.1 99
G. Waiver of Fees
1. The Right to Receive a Free Transcript.-In addition to the
right to be represented by counsel at a hearing, 00 the EAHCA
grants parents the right to receive a written or electronic record of
the hearing.201 The record is essential if aggrieved parents appeal the
hearing officer's decision. 2  Parents who cannot afford the cost of
duplicating the record are at an extreme disadvantage.
Some states afford parents the right to receive a record of the
proceedings if parents request the transcript, 20 8 but other statutes
stipulate that the record is "available"'0 4 to parents or may be ob-
tained after paying for the actual 05 or reasonable 2° cost of duplica-
tion. In any event, if parents are unable to afford the charge, they
are incapable of availing themselves of their statutory rights. By
197. Id. at (c)(1),(2).
198. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975), the Supreme Court cautioned that
"[nleither the property interest in educational benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty inter-
est in reputation, which is also implicated, is so insubstantial that suspensions may constitu-
tionally be imposed by any procedure the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary."
199. Commenting on the necessity of counsel, Justice Sutherland states that "[t]he right
to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
200. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1976). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(a)(1) (1982).
201. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (1976). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(a)(4) (1982).
202. For a brief description of administrative procedure, see supra note 18.
203. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-76h(e) (West Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
115.81(4) (West Supp. 1982-1983). Although parents in both Connecticut and Wisconsin
must request a copy of the transcript before they receive it, Wisconsin's statute places the onus
on the hearing officer to apprise parents of their right to obtain a free transcript of the
proceedings.
204. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404(1) (McKinney 1981) (a record "shall be maintained and
made available to" parents); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 28-1.90)(2) (1978) ("[a] verbatim
record of the hearing shall be kept"); 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 13.32(16) (Shepard's 1983)
("[a] record of the hearing shall be made and shall be available to the parent"). While schools
in New York and Pennsylvania make a record available to parents, the provisions fail to indi-
cate if there is a fee charged for doing so. To whom New Jersey makes the record available is
unclear.
205. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 5.01.07A(7)(f) (1982).
206. Id. at § 5.01.07B(7)(f) (1982).
waiving the fee when parents cannot afford to duplicate the record,
Pennsylvania can best accomplish the EAHCA's "goal of providing
full educational opportunity to all handicapped children.
'20 7
2. Waiver of the Fee to File a Civil Action.-In similar cases,
the cost of filing a civil action should also be waived. Unlike the cost
of duplicating the record, the fee for filing a civil action is not dis-
cussed in state education regulations, but is addressed by court rules.
Parents who wish to avoid paying this fee,20 8 must file a petition
to proceed in forma pauperis 0 9 before a court clerk will enter a civil
action or file any papers.2 10 This petition does not guarantee waiver;
rather, the matter is discretionary with the court which must con-
sider the petitioner's employment, income, assets, and liabilities.
Since waiver is within the court's discretion, parents may be reluc-
tant to initiate further proceedings after they have exhausted their
administrative remedies. To safeguard parents' statutory right to
bring a civil action, 11 Pennsylvania should bear the cost of the filing
fee.
V. Model Rules to Safeguard the Handicapped Child's Right to
Receive a Free Appropriate Public Education in Pennsylvania
A workable set of rules implies more than ambiguous provisions
that operate as a cryptic code. Rules should provide procedural
guidelines incapable of varied interpretations.21 3 Furthermore, regu-
lations not only must effectuate the above criteria, but preserve the
handicapped child's right to a free appropriate public education and
his concomitant right to procedural protections granted by the
EAHCA and promote judicial economy by ensuring efficient and
functional administrative procedures.
Model rules that modify, alter, and add to Pennsylvania's spe-
cial education scheme would provide the following:
214
1. No student shall be denied access to a free and full public
education, on account of race, religion, sex, national origin, or
handicap215
207. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(A) (1976).
208. There is a $60 filing fee in federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (Supp. V 1981).
209. Id. at § 1915(a) (1976).
210. M.D. PA. R. 808.
211. See supra note 18.
212. Unclear provisions regarding the right to an independent evaluation at public ex-
pense, the right to an impartial hearing officer, and the right to receive a transcript of the
-hearing lead to unsatisfactory results. See, e.g., supra note 79; Savka v. Pennsylvania, 44 Pa.
Commw. 62, 403 A.2d 142 (1979).
213. See HARV. L. REV., supra note 24, at 1110 (suggesting that school officials will
more likely observe clear guidelines than ignore flexible rules).
214. The proposed rules are drawn from those state statutory and regulatory provisions
that best enable a handicapped child to receive a free appropriate public education.
215. This rule adds "or handicapped" to 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 12.4 (Shepard's 1983).
2. Each school district shall affirmatively seek out all individuals
with special needs."'
3. Each school district's board of education shall establish a
committee on the handicapped (COH), composed of at least a
school psychologist, a special education teacher or administrator,
a school physician, and a parent of a handicapped child residing
in the school district, provided that the parent is not an em-
ployee of the school district or under contract to the district . 1
Members of the COH shall serve without compensation, but
shall be entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred in fur-
thering their service." 8
4. The COH's duties shall include the following:
(a) The COH shall notify parents that their child might be
in need of special education services." 9
(b) The COH shall notify parents before the child's educa-
tional placement is changed."
20
(c) The COH's notification shall inform parents of their
right to an independent evaluation at public expense if they dis-
agree with the school district's evaluation and recommendation.
Parents shall be given a detailed description of the evaluation
procedure and the purposes the evaluation shall serve."'
(i) The notification shall inform parents of the date,
time, and place where the COH shall meet to discuss
their child. The notice shall advise parents of their right
to speak to the COH regarding the evaluation proce-
dure. Parents may be accompanied by anyone, including
an attorney. 2
(ii) The notification shall contain telephone numbers
and locations of associations available to assist parents
with understanding the procedures involved in providing
their child with an appropriate education. The notice
shall include an estimation of the cost of the associa-
tion's services.12*
(iii) The notification shall contain telephone numbers
The writer of this provision reproves the Pennsylvania State Board of Education for neglecting
to prohibit discrimination against handicapped students in § 12.4 of the Pennsylvania Code.
Moreover, by omitting the handicapped from this section, the State Board does not seem vehe-
mently opposed to discrimination against the handicapped. Memorandum to students and their
parents, friends and advocates from Caryl Andrea Oberman, a lawyer affiliated with the Edu-
cation Law Center, Inc., in Philadelphia (Oct. 25, 1982) (regarding Pennsylvania State Board
of Education's proposed changes in regulations covering students' rights and discipline).
216. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56300 (West Supp. 1982).
217. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4402 (McKinney 1981).
218. Id. Since a salaried member is dependent on the school district for remuneration,
he would more likely feel pressured to favor school district policy than a volunteer.
219. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
222. NEW YORK GUIDE, supra note 191, at 9.
223. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
and addresses of organizations or individuals who pro-
vide free or low-cost legal services to parents at a due
process hearing or civil action.2 If parents wish to be
represented by an attorney but cannot afford one, the
school district shall bear the attorney's fees when free
or low-cost legal aid is unavailable."'
(iv) The notification, written in layman terms, shall
comply with the requirements enumerated in the Edu-
cation for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and
in the Code of Federal Regulations.
(d) The COH is authorized to receive and investigate com-
piaints, and to conduct hearings with power of subpoena, on be-
half of any handicapped child regarding failure to comply with
federal or state laws and regulations for handicapped children.
Any person may present a complaint to the COH concerning the
school district's noncompliance with the federal or state special
education laws and regulations.2
(e) The COH shall organize a public awareness program
detailing the available special education programs and related
services.1
2 7
(f) The COH shall develop in-service education programs
for parents of handicapped children.228
5. The state education department shall prepare and distribute a
handbook to parents of handicapped children and members of
the school district's COH. The handbook shall explain, in lay-
man terms, the financial and educational obligations of the state,
the county or city, the home school district, the COH, the spe-
cial services or programs available for handicapped children and
their parents, and the administrative and legal procedures avail-
able to aggrieved parents.' 2"
(a) The handbook shall inform parents of the telephone
numbers and locations of associations available to assist parents
with understanding the procedures involved in providing their
child with an appropriate education. The handbook shall include
an estimation of the cost of the association's services.
(b) The handbook shall inform parents of the telephone
numbers and addresses of organizations and individuals'"0 who
are available to assist parents at a due process hearing or civil
action. The handbook shall explain that if parents wish to be
224. See supra note 93-94' and accompanying text.
225. See generally supra notes 175-199 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 124.
227. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
229. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 4403(8) (McKinney 1981). See supra note 96 and accompany-
ing text.
230. A layman experienced with the handicapped may be as effective as a lawyer with
limited or no experience. See HARv. LAW. RFv., supra note 24, at 1112 n.56.
represented by a lawyer but are unable to afford one, then the
school district shall bear the attorney's fees.
6. A handicapped child's individualized education program
(IEP) shall include a history of the child's past misconduct."
7. Prior to disciplining a handicapped child, a school official
shall first determine that there is no connection between the
child's misconduct and his handicap."' 2
8. The school official shall examine the child's IEP to discern
whether the child's present misconduct is similar to past pat-
terns of behavior indicated in the IEP.
2 s3
9. No handicapped child shall be excluded from school if his
behavior was a manifestation of his handicap." 4
10. School districts shall develop programs that permit a misbe-
having student to be disciplined while not interrupting his
education."'
11. A handicapped child and his parents shall receive written
notice when the school proposes the change the child's educa-
tional status. If parents fail to respond to the notice, an eligible
child may contest the proposed change.""
12. Parents shall have the right to an impartial hearing regard-
ing their child's placement. The hearing officer shall not be em-
ployed by the school district where the child resides or by any
state agency. Educators and psychologists who are knowledgea-
ble in the special education field may serve as hearing officers.
To ensure the officer's impartiality, parties may question the of-
ficer concerninghis knowledge of the case. The officer's creden-
231. See supra notes 113-119 and accompanying text.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. A socially and emotionally disturbed or learning disabled child should not receive
fewer procedural protections than a mentally retarded child. See supra notes 131-133 and
accompanying text.
235. Exclusion from school serves only to interrupt the education of a child who is not
causing a danger to himself or others. Moreover, "[s]uspension and exclusion of troublesome
students are only expedient solutions to the problem of maintaining a safe environment for
learning in" schools. Jefferson, Student Rights, Discipline, and Social Responsibility in Amer-
ican Education for the Year 1977, in STUDENT RIGHTS AND DISCIPLINE: POLICIES, PROGRAMS,
AND PROCEDURES 10 (1978). See Jones v. Gillespie, 60 Pa. D.&C. 2d 576, 579 (1973) (discus-
sion of the deleterious effects of a five day suspension).
If a child's misconduct is a reflection of the frustration he feels when his educational
program inadequately meets his needs, exclusion exacerbates, rather than solves, the problem.
PARENTS UNION FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SUSPENDED STUDENTS-SUSPENDED LEARNING: A
REPORT ON SUSPENSIONS IN THE PHILADELPHIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS 5-6 (1982). Thus, as school
officials treat the symptom by using expedient measures, they invariably evade the cause. See
Kaeser, Suspensions and School Discipline, I I EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY 465 (1979),
reprinted in S. GOLDSTEIN & E.G. GEE, LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 387 (1980).
As an alternative to exclusion, school officials should consider re-evaluating the child to
determine whether the child's misbehavior is attributable to an improper placement. In addi-
tion, schools should consider in-school suspension, hands-on vocational education programs
with local mental health agencies, and work study programs for some students. Sindelar, Sus-
pensions and Expulsions of Handicapped Students: The Evolving Case Law, 12 SCHOOL LAW
BULLETIN 1, 9 (1981). See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GUIDE, supra note 71, at 12-13.
236. See supra notes 104-112 and accompanying text.
tials shall be available for scrutiny by their parents. The hearing
officer shall be cognizant of federal and state laws and regula-
tions regarding special education.
2 7
13. A school may suggest mediation to resolve disputes prior to
initiating the formal due process hearing. Parents are not obli-
gated to resort to mediation.
2 88
14. Parents shall have the right to compel the attendance of wit-
nesses at a hearing. The hearing officer is authorized to require
that a witness who fails to appear shall pay the reasonable ex-
penses, including attorney's fees, caused by his nonappearance,




15. The school district shall inform parents of their right to ob-
tain a record of the proceedings at public expense.
240
16. Every instructor or school employee who comes in contact
with handicapped children shall be qualified to recognize and
handle their problems.
17. Each school district shall devote one full day a year to an in-
service program to educate regular and special education teach-
ers and school administrators about handicapped children.
2 41
18. An individual is liable if he intentionally or negligently
causes harm to the educational progress of a handicapped
child.
24 1
19. The Pennsylvania Legislature shall appoint an equal educa-
tional opportunity (EEO) officer and staff to ensure that every
handicapped child receives a free appropriate public education.
The duties of the EEO officer and his staff shall include the
following:
(a) The EEO officer shall investigate complaints concerning
Pennsylvania's noncompliance with the EAHCA;
(b) The EEO officer shall periodically advertise on radio,
237. See supra notes 142-174 and accompanying text.
238. An adversarial hearing may not be the best solution for resolving differences be-
tween parents and schools regarding the child's program. Some states have found mediation to
be a less stressful alternative. Following mediation, an aggrieved party still may have a formal
due process hearing if he desires one. 34 C.F.R. § 300.506, comment (1982). Statutes in Cali-
fornia and Connecticut provide for a mediation conference in lieu of an administrative review
of a child's educational placement. If mediation fails to resolve the parties' dispute, either
party may initiate a hearing. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56503 (West Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 10-76h(b) (West Supp. 1982).
239. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(E). Notwithstanding statutes and regulations that give
parents the right to compel the attendance of witnesses, the provisions offer no concomitant
remedy if witnesses disregard a subpoena commanding their presence at a hearing. Without a
sanction, a child's procedural due process rights are toothless.
240. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
242. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1958(c) (West 1982). ("Individuals who intentionally or by
grossly negligent acts or omissions cause damages to an exceptional child or other individual
participating in a special education or handicapped program" will be liable for civil damages
resulting from their acts or omissions in rendering the requisite care or services.) See supra
note 18.
television, and in newspapers regarding the problems and rights
of handicapped children;
(c) Interested people may use a toll-free telephone number
to question the EEO officer or his staff about the rights of handi-
capped children; and
(d) The EEO staff lawyers shall represent handicapped
children whose parents are unable to afford a lawyer, whose par-
ents are uninterested in pursuing their child's rights, or who are
wards of the state.
2 48
VI. Conclusion
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 guar-
antees each handicapped child the right to a free appropriate public
education and establishes due process safeguards to protect that
right. Pennsylvania's special education statutes and regulations are
ambiguous and inadequate and, therefore, insufficiently protect a
handicapped child's rights. These rights will not be secured if his
parents are unaware of them and incapable of understanding or ar-
ticulating the child's needs. Furthermore, rules that discriminate
against certain handicapped children and deter appeals from errone-
ous placement decisions contravene the EAHCA's goal.
Adoption of the model rules detailed above would clarify cur-
rent vague provisions, educate parents who are unaware of their
child's rights, and provide workable rules for school officials. Until
handicapped children are afforded the protections guaranteed by the
EAHCA, their rights will exist in theory-but not in practice.
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